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Abstract—With the development of smart cities, not only
are all corners of the city connected to each other, but also
connected from city to city. They form a large distributed network
together, which can facilitate the integration of distributed energy
station (DES) and corresponding smart aggregators. Neverthe-
less, because of potential security and privacy protection arisen
from trustless energies trading, how to make such energies
trading goes smoothly is a tricky challenge. In this paper, we
propose a blockchain-based multiple energies trading (B-MET)
system for secure and efficient energies trading by executing a
smart contract we design. Because energies trading requires the
blockchain in B-MET system to have high throughput and low
latency, we design a new byzantine-based consensus mechanism
(BCM) based on node’s credit to improve efficiency for the
consortium blockchain under the B-MET system. Then, we take
combined heat and power (CHP) system as a typical example
that provides distributed energies. We quantify their utilities, and
model the interactions between aggregators and DESs in a smart
city by a novel multi-leader multi-follower Stackelberg game. It
is analyzed and solved by reaching Nash equilibrium between
aggregators, which reflects the competition between aggregators
to purchase energies from DESs. In the end, we conduct plenty
of numerical simulations to evaluate and verify our proposed
model and algorithms, which demonstrate their correctness and
efficiency completely.
Index Terms—Distributed energies trading, Smart city, Con-
sortium blockchain, Byzantine consensus, Stackelberg game.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE deployment of distributed energy stations (DESs)based on the internet built by the development of smart
cities has been a hot topic because of its great potential to
reduce the consumption of fossil fuels and curb greenhouse
gas emission [1]. Consider a smart community equipped with
a DES, it is used to supply residents in this community
with multiple energies, such as electricity and heat. DES
existing in the community can reduce residents’ dependence
on the centralized supply of energies, such as electricity from
power grid and heat from heat station, thus save resources
and reduce the cost of using energies. Moreover, it can sell
surplus electricity and heat to the aggregators of power grid
and heat station for making revenue. DESs can trade their
surplus energies with aggregators that are responsible for
collecting energies from their communities in a peer-to-peer
(P2P) manner, thereby the multiple energies trading problem
discussed in this paper is formulated.
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Traditional P2P energies trading is performed on the cen-
tralized energy management platform, however, such a mech-
anism has many drawbacks. Traders often worry that their
payment security and privacy protection when trading in an
untrusted and opaque third centralized platform. This inter-
mediary needs to verify and manage transactions between
aggregators and DESs. If troubled by some damages such
as single point of failure, it will lead to privacy leakage and
transaction loss [2]. Thus, it is urgent to create a secure ener-
gies trading system to guarantee trading among the distributed
internet of energy can be executed effectively. It encourages
the DESs to sell their energies to aggregators without worry,
which promotes the rational use of energies.
Blockchain is a public and distributed database that is
designed to store verified transactions among all valid partici-
pants without a trusted intermediary. Here, a new transaction is
required to be validated by a group of authorized participants,
and then it can be added into the blockchain in a permanent
and tamper-resistant manner. It can be used to construct a
secure and reliable energies trading system because of its
decentralization, security, and anonymity [3] [4]. Consider a
smart city, it consists of a number of communities, each of
which is equipped with a DES. There are two aggregators,
electricity aggregator (EA) and heat aggregator (HA), trading
with DESs in this city. The aggregators of different cities
are interconnected to form a wide area network. Based on
that, we propose a blockchain-based multiple energies trad-
ing (B-MET) system, where all aggregators are authorized
participants required to store the blockchain and complete
the consensus process. Thus this is a consortium blockchain
as well, which is a little different from the classical public
blockchain used in Bitcoin and Ethereum. Here, consortium
blockchain is more convenient and flexible to achieve trading
functions.
Based on such an architecture, we design a smart contract
that ensures energies trading to be performed automatically
when the trading conditions are satisfied. However, the proof-
based consensus mechanism such as proof-of-work that is
adopted by the most of blockchain applications is not suitable
to our consortium blockchain in B-MET system because of
its high latency, low throughput, and demanding computing
power requirement. To finish the task of energies trading,
it needs low latency and high throughput consensus mecha-
nism. Thereby we design a new byzantine-based consensus
mechanism (BCM) based on node’s credit, which reflects
the performance of this node in the previous experience of
participating in consensus. After each round of consensus,
each node’s credit should be updated according to its voting
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result. If its voting is consistent with the result of consensus,
its credit will be increased; otherwise will be decreased. Their
credits affect directly their probabilities of being chosen as
the leader and voting weight in the next round. This not only
motivates participants to make the right decision, but also
speeds up the consensus process.
In the aforementioned contract, there is an interaction
between aggregator and DES before initiate a new energies
trading, where the aggregator offers a unit price to purchase
a kind of energy from DES, then DES decides the amount
of energy they are willing to sell. In this paper, we take
combined heat and power (CHP) system as an instance of
DES, and aggregators are EA and HA. In a smart city, for
each DES in this city, its utility consists of two parts: one is to
serve the residents living in the community for satisfying their
Daily consumption, and the other is sold to the aggregators
for gaining revenues. For the aggregators in this city, their
gains come from buying energies from DESs at a lower price
and selling them at the retail price. To motivate the DESs to
sell more energies, the aggregators should offer a higher price
to them, but doing so raises costs and may result in lower
overall profits. Since the multilevel decision-making processes
between aggregators and DESs in a city, we formulate a
novel multi-leader multi-follower (MLMF) Stackelberg game
to model this bargain between them. Here the aggregators are
leaders and DESs are followers. Their goals are to maximize
their utilities or profits respectively. This MLMF Stackelberg
game is analyzed and solved thoroughly in this paper, and we
prove the Nash equilibrium (NE) among aggregators exists
and is unique. Because the DESs are always able to respond
aggregators with the optimal strategy according to their offered
prices, the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) exists and is unique
as well. We propose a distributed algorithm that is guaranteed
to reach the unique SE by limited information interactions.
Finally, we conduct extensive numerical simulations to test the
B-MET system, verify the correctness of our proposed utility
functions and feasibility of our proposed algorithm.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Sec. II
discusses the-state-of-art work. Sec. III introduces the ar-
chitecture of B-MET system, describes CHP system, and
defines utility functions. Sec. IV presents smart contract and
byzantine-based blockchain. Sec. V introduces the Stackelberg
game and discuess the solving process. Sec. VI conducts
numerical simulations. Sec. VII is conclusion.
II. RELATED WORK
Distributed energy systems have been applied widely in
many different forms, such as DES [5] and vehicle-to-grid
[6] [7], to curb greenhouse gas and save cost. Integrating
DESs into a smart grid [8] has attracted more and more
researchers to participate in recently. This rouse the problems
of energy management and energy trading problem. Cecati et
al. [9] exploited DES to make the cost of power delivery min-
imized by use of an efficient smart grid management system.
Georgilakis et al. [1] summarized the optimally distributed
generation placement problem systematically, classified and
analyzed current and future research about it. Zhang et al. [10]
considered microgrid as a local energy supplier for domestic
buildings by utilizing DES, and studied optimal scheduling
of energy consumption through mixed-integer programming.
However, they only focused on electricity trading between grid
and DESs, in this paper we consider multiple energies trading
due to the diversity of energy forms.
In P2P energy trading, blockchain technology has been in-
troduced to address transaction security issues. Kang et al. [11]
put forward a localized P2P electricity trading pattern based on
consortium blockchain among plug-in hybrid electric vehicles.
Li et al. [12] proposed a P2P energy trading architecture
based on consortium blockchain for the industrial internet of
things relied on a credit-based payment scheme. zhou et al.
[7] considered the scenario of vehicle-to-grid, and developed
a secure energy trading mechanism based on consortium
blockchain. Guo et al. [13] studied a blockchain-based energy
management system that guarantees secure electricity trading
between grid and DESs. However, they lose sight of low
throughput and high latency in their proof-based consensus
process, in this paper we try to address it by proposing a new
byzantine-based consensus mechanism.
Stackelberg game is an effective tool to model the inter-
actions in energies trading. Maharjan et al. [14] studied the
demand response management by establishing a Stackelberg
game between multiple utility companies and customers to
maximized their utilities respectively. Bu et al. [15] proposed
a four-stage Stackelberg game to consider a real-time pricing
problem for the electricity retailer in the demand-side man-
agement. Yao et al. [16] modeled the interactions between
cloud server and mines by Stackelberg game, and solved it by
multiagent reinforcement learning algorithm. Chen et al. [17]
proposed a Stackelberg game-based framework to simulate
the multiple resources allocation between cloud server and
end users, and found an equilibrium solution by a backward
induction process. However, most of these models have only
one leader, in this paper the interactions between aggregators
and DESs are MLMF, more complex and realistic.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Consider a smart city, it consists of a number of dis-
joint smart communities, each of which is equipped with
a distributed energy station (DES) responsible for supply-
ing multiple energies, such as electricity and heat, to these
residents living in this community. In this city, there are
several aggregators, which represent different companies re-
spectively, collecting different kinds of energies from all DESs
appertained to this city. The architecture of blockchain-based
multiple energies trading (B-MET) system is shown in Fig. 1.
In the B-MET system, given a smart city Si, the entities in
this smart city can be shown as follows:
1) Aggregators: There are two aggregators, electricity ag-
gregator (EAi) and heat aggregator (HAi), associated with
this smart city Si. The EAi (resp. HAi) is delegated by power
grid (resp. heat station) as a monopoly of the energy market.
They purchase electric energy (resp. heat energy) generated
by DESs in those communities that belong to this smart city.
2) DESs: The city Si can be partitioned into an un-
certain number of disjoint smart communities, denoted by
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Fig. 1. The architecture of blockchain-based multiple energies trading system.
set {Ci1,Ci2, · · · ,Cij , · · · }. In community Cij , there is a
distributed energy station DESij supplying electricity and heat
to the residents living in this community. Besides, DESij is
able to sell surplus electric energy (resp. heat energy) to the
corresponding EAi (resp. HAi) in order to make revenues.
3) Smart meters: It is a built-in component installed in
each aggregator that monitors the energy flow transferred by
each DES in this city in real-time, and decide whether the
transaction has been accomplished.
Then, consider a larger ecosystem, such as a country, it
is composed of a number of smart cities. This ecosystem
S can be denoted by S = {S1,S2, · · · ,Si, · · · }. Here, each
Si ∈ S is a smart city in this ecosystem, and Si =
{{EAi,HAi}, {Ci1,Ci2, · · · ,Cij , · · · }}. For convenience, the
notation DESij can be considered equivalent to Cij . Our B-
MET system is established on such an ecosystem, in which all
aggregators, including EAs and HAs, are interconnected each
other to form a peer-to-peer (P2P) network called “blockchain
network”, shown in the upper half of Fig. 1. In order to
support secure energy trading between aggregators and DESs,
we adopt consortium blockchain to construct our B-MET. In
traditional blockchain, the consensus process is carried out
by all participants. But the blockchain in the B-MET takes
all aggregators in the ecosystem as authorized participants,
and they are charged with storing the whole blockchain and
performing the consensus process. Each aggregator manages
and records those transactions between it and DESs in its
city. The transactions are packaged into blocks and added into
blockchain when the consensus among aggregators is reached,
thus stored in all aggregators permanently.
A. Combined Heat and Power System
Here, the aforementioned DES is implemented by the
combined heat and power (CHP) system. The CHP system
Fig. 2. The structure of combined heat and power (CHP) system.
consumes natural gas to generate electricity and heat that serve
its community or sell to the aggregators of its corresponding
city, shown in Fig. 2. The gas is fed into the gas turbine (GT)
which will generate electricity Eg and emit high-temperature
waste heat Qw. The heat Qw can be recovered by heat recovery
system that can generate heat Qr. Here, Euse (resp. Quse) is
used to supply electricity (resp. heat) to community, and Eexc
(resp. Qexc) is sold to EA (resp. HA).
Shown as Fig. 2, the total electricity generated by GT is
Eg = Euse + Eexc. Measured in days, the units of quantities
denoted by E and Q are (J/day). The gas consumption per
day F (m3/day) can be defined as
F = Eg/(q · ηg) = Qw/(q · (1− ηg)) (1)
where q (J/m3) is the calorific value of natural gas, thereby
the total energy generated by F is q ·F definitely. The ηg is the
electric conversion of GT, percentage energy that transferred
to electricity. Given a specific GT, its electric conversion can
be considered as a constant. Besides, let ηr be the thermal
efficiency of heat recovery system, and ηh = 1 be the thermal
efficiency of heat component. We have Qr = Qw ·ηr = Qpre+
Qexc and Quse = Qpre respectively.
As mentioned above, for a given CHP system, the electricity
(resp. heat) generated by it can be divided into two parts: one is
used to serve local residents, another is sold to EA (resp. HA).
Thus, we define two dispatching factor α, β ∈ [0, 1] for this
CHP, where α = Euse/Eg is the electric dispatching factor
and β = Qpre/Qr is the heat dispatching factor. This DES
needs to buy natural gas from the gas company. The company
is for profit, thus it is valid to assume the gas company always
supply enough gas that is able to meet the DES’s requirement.
Given a smart city Si and a smart community Cij ∈ Si,
the energy relationships in the CHP system of Cij has been
obtained, that is
Eijuse = α
ij · ηg · (qF ij) (2)
Eijexc = (1− αij) · ηg · (qF ij) (3)
Qijuse = β
ij · (1− ηg) · ηr · (qF ij) (4)
Qijexc = (1− βij) · (1− ηg) · ηr · (qF ij) (5)
In this model, we assume all the CHP equipments in this
ecosystem S has the same efficiency parameters ηg and ηr.
Each CHPij can determine the amount of electricity (resp.
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heat) that can be sold to EAi (resp. HAi) by adjusting its
dispatching factor αij (resp. βij) automonously. For example,
when αij is one, it means that CHPij will not sell any
electricity to EAi for making revenue.
B. Utility Functions
Consider a smart city Si, the EAi (resp. HAi) offers a unit
price pie (resp. p
i
h) to collect surplus electricity (resp. heat)
generated by DESij ∈ Si, where the units of pie and pih are
coin/J. For each DESij ∈ Si, it is a risk-averse agent in the
energy market. If DESij chooses dispatching factor αij , βij ,
and consume natural gas F ij , that is
U ij(αij , βij , F ij) = W ije (E
ij
use) +W
ij
h (Q
ij
use)
+ pie · Eijexc + pih ·Qijexc − cf · F ij (6)
where W ije (resp. W
ij
h ) is the satisfaction function of com-
munity Cij that provides electricity (resp. heat) to satisfy
the usage of local residents in this community, and Eijuse,
Eijexc, Q
ij
use, and Q
ij
exc are defined from (2) to (5). Here, cf
(coin/m3) is the unit cost of natural gas.
From our simplified CHP model, we denote the cost of
electricity (resp. heat) produced from DESij by ce (resp.
ch). Then, the cost (coin/J) of electricity and heat can be
quantified, that is ce = cf/q and ch = cf/(q · ηr). Thus, we
have cf · F ij = ηg · ce · (qF ij) + (1− ηg) · ch · ηr · (qF ij). If
the price pie (resp. p
i
h) offered by EAi (resp. HAi) is less than
the cost ce (resp. ch), this DESij will not sell any electricity
(resp. heat) to them. It will reduce the gas intake F ij such that
only meet its local requirement. Like this, there is no energies
trading between aggregators and DESs, and obviously, it is
not what we want to see. Thus, it is reasonable to consider the
prices offered by aggregators satisfy pie ≥ ce and pih ≥ ch. At
this time, for each DESij ∈ Si, it will produce electricity and
heat as much as possible, because of the fact that it is always
profitable to sell them to the aggregators. For maximizing
its utility, each CHP system will run at full capacity. Here,
for each CHPij , we define its maximum production capacity
(maximum gas consumption) per day as F ijm . Therefore, the
utility U ij(αij , βij , F ijm ) can be denoted by U
ij(αij , βij),
because F ijm is considered as a constant.
Remark 1. After here, we denote Xij = ηg · (qF ijm ) and
Y ij = (1− ηg) · ηr · (qF ijm ) for convenience.
Based on [14] [18] [6], the natural logarithmic functions
were adopted extensively in characterizing the satisfaction of
comsuming energy. That is
W ije (E
ij
use) = k
ij
e · ln(1 + bije · Eijuse) (7)
W ijh (Q
ij
use) = k
ij
h · ln(1 + bijh ·Qijuse) (8)
where kije (resp. k
ij
h ) is a non-negative satisfaction coefficient
for electricity (resp. heat) in community Cij , and bije (resp. b
ij
h )
is a non-negative adaption coefficient electricity (resp. heat) in
this community as well. The adaption coefficients were pro-
posed in [13] first, which aimed to control the variation range
of the term ln(1 + ·), avoid it growing infinitely. Generally,
we let ln(1 + bije · Eijuse) = 1 (resp. ln(1 + bijh · Qijuse) = 1)
when we choose αij = 1 (resp. βij = 1) by setting a valid
adaption coefficient bije (resp. b
ij
h ) [13]. Base on that, thereby
we can formulate bije and b
ij
h as follows:
bije = (1/X
ij) · (e− 1); bijh = (1/Y ij) · (e− 1) (9)
For aggregators in this city, power grid and heat station
are the retailers for electricity and heat, however they do not
have pricing power, because the retail prices of electricity and
heat subject to government’s regulation. Hence, we define a
retail price re (resp. rh) of electricity (resp. heat). As a selfish
participant, it requires that pie ∈ [ce, re] and pih ∈ [ch, rh].
From (6), if pie (resp. p
i
h) offered by EAi (resp. HAi) is
too low, each DESij ∈ Si will respond with raising its
dispatching factor αij (resp. βij), and sell less energy to
aggregators. If the aggregators offer a high price to purchase
energy, their profitable spaces are reduced even if DESs are
willing to sell more energies to them. Both of these cases
will cause aggregators’ profit to be cut down. Therefore, it is
important for aggregators to offer a optimal price such that not
only encourage DESs to sell more energies, but also ensure
sufficient profitability. If EAi (resp. HAi)) offers a price pie
(resp. pih), its profit function can be defined as
V ie (p
i
e, p
i
h) = (re − pie) ·
∑
Cij∈Si
Eijexc (10)
V ih(p
i
h, p
i
e) = (rh − pih) ·
∑
Cij∈Si
Qijexc (11)
where V ie (resp. V
i
h) is the profit function of the EAi (resp.
HAi) that collects electricity (resp. heat) from DESs in its city,
and Eijexc and Q
ij
exc are defined in (3) and (5).
IV. BYZANTINE-BASED BLOCKCHAIN
In this section, we will introduce a smart contract used to
perform energies trading, and design a novel byzantine-based
consensus mechanism based on the B-MET system.
A. Smart Contract
A smart contract is a collection of programmable digital
agreement that every participant commit to comply. Under
our blockchain-based energies trading ecosystem, a trans-
action can only happen between aggregators and DESs in
the same city. Thereby, consider a city Si, a smart contract
can be decided together by its participants, which consist
of an aggregator k ∈ {EAi,HAi} and a DESij ∈ Si. We
denote such a smart contract by Contract(k,DESij , ST ime).
Between anonymous and untrusted entities in a city, the
smart contract is able to execute credible transactions without
third institutions. Then, the procedure of its smart contract
Contract(k,DESij , ST ime) is presented as follows:
1) System initialization: At the beginning, each DESij ∈ Si
needs to acquire a unique identification IDij by registering in
the designated institution authorized by government. It will be
assigned with its public/private key pair (PKij , SKij) and a
Accountij . That is
{IDij , PKij , SKij , Accountij} ← register(DESij)
where each account is associated with its wallet address
and balance, Accountij ← {Addressij , Balanceij}. Then,
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for each aggregator k ∈ {EAi,HAi} in this city, it has
those necessary information {IDk, PKk, SKk, Accountk}
as well. But there is a credit value Creditk that rep-
resent the reputation of aggregator k, thereby we have
Accountk ← {Addressk, Balancek, Creditk}. Here, tech-
nologies of asymmetric encryption are usually adopted by
current blockchain system for the sake of security, privacy, and
data integrity. Given a massage msg encrypted by DESij , we
have Hash(msg) = PKij(SKij(Hash(msg))), where the
unforgeability and integrity is guaranteed.
2) Creation: An aggregator k ∈ {EAi,HAi} of-
fers a price pk to buy energy from communities in its
city, then DESij responds it with the amount of energy
x ∈ {Eijexc, Qijexc} that can be sold to k. Like this, a
new smart contract Contract(k,DESij , ST ime) is gener-
ated by signing with their private key respectively. Then,
this contract will be broadcasted to all authorized partic-
ipants (aggregators) in the ecosystem S. After reaching a
consensus, this smart contract will be deployed and ex-
ecuted automatically. Each smart contract between aggre-
gator and DES, Contract(k,DESij , ST ime), is associated
with several variables, which include account information
(Accountk, Accountij), offered price pk, amount of energy
x, expected transaction time TransT ime, and timestamp
STime. To guarantee this contract can be executed success-
fully, it needs to verify whether aggregator k has sufficient
balance such that Balancek ≥ pk · x and whether DESij has
enough production capacity to supply x amount of correspond-
ing energy on time.
3) Execution: The Contract(k,DESij , ST ime) will be
executed if current time t ≥ TransTime after reaching a
consensus among aggregators in blockchain network. From
now on, it begins to trade energy and finish payment. The
smart meter in aggregator k verifies whether the amount of
energy has been transported to the designated location. Then,
fed this result from smart meter into the smart contract, if yes,
it will execute the payment process automatically, that is
(k,Balancek − pk · x); (DESij , Balanceij + pk · x)
Here, we design a mechanism that the balance is permitted to
be negative. At the moment of payment, the smart contract will
complete payment as usual if the k’s balance is not enough
to pay. In this way, the k’s balance will become negative.
Then, any contract that aggregator k participants in will not
be executed until its balance back to be positive.
Generally speaking, the energies trading between aggrega-
tors and DESs can be summarized as follows: In a smart
city, a DES begins a smart contract with an aggregator by
responding it according to its offered price. This contract needs
to be verified by the consensus process in blockchain network.
Then, it will execute the predefined procedure automatically
once the trading conditions are met, which achieves the digital
currency and energy exchange specified by contract between
participants in a secure manner.
B. Byzantine-based Consensus mechanism
As mentioned early, a consensus process is necessary to be
performed so as to ensure the consistency of blockchain stored
Fig. 3. The consensus process of BCM.
in every authorized node. Castro et al. [19] proposed a prac-
tical byzantine fault tolerance (PBFT) algorithm, which has
been used in consortium blockchain system widely. Based on
it and combined with the characteristics of energies trading, we
design a new byzantine-based consensus mechanism (BCM).
Our consensus process is performed among all aggregators in
the ecosystem S, and each of them has a local transaction
pool (LTP) to store all transactions it receives. The consensus
process is executed round by round, and the time interval of
block generation is given by ∆T . There are three main stages,
shown in Fig. 3, that is pre-prepare, prepare, and commit.
First, let us introduce the credit model, which will be used
in leader election and to decide whether to reach a consensus.
Let M = {EA1,HA1,EA2,HA2, · · · } be the collection of
consensus nodes. We have known that there is an attribute
Creditk ∈ [0, 1] for each k ∈ M , where a larger Creditk
implies node k is more trustworthy. We denote by Creditk(i)
the credit of node k after finishing the i-th round consensus.
Then, we can define Creditk(i+ 1) according to the result of
consensus in the (i+ 1)-th round, where this result is whether
to add the leader’s block into the blockchain. That is: (1) when
k is the leader, we have Creditk(i+1) = min{1, Creditk(i)+
∆1} if its block is accepted to be added into the blockchain,
else Creditk(i + 1) = max{0, Creditk(i) − ∆1} if its
block is rejected; and (2) when k is not the leader, we have
Creditk(i + 1) = min{1, Creditk(i) + ∆2} if its decision
is consistent with consensus result; else Creditk(i + 1) =
max{0, Creditk(i) − ∆2} if it disagrees with the majority.
We usually give ∆1 > ∆2 > 0 and initialize the credit of
each consensus node as creditk(0) = 0.5. Consider entering
the (i + 1)-th round consensus, the detailed process of BCM
is represented as follows:
1) Leader election: The first step in this round is to select a
leader from all consensus nodes. This leader election is based
on node’s credit. Generally speaking, the better the credit value
of a node, the more likely it is to be elected as the leader.
Thus, the result of leader selection is unpredictable. For a
node k ∈M , the probability that it is elected as the leader of
the (i+ 1)-th round consensus is Pr[L(i+ 1) = k],
Pr[L(i+ 1) = k] =
Creditk(i)∑
j∈M Creditj(i)
(12)
where L(i + 1) represents the leader of the (i + 1)-th round
consensus. Obviously, there is no chance to select a node
whose credit is zero as the leader.
2) Broadcast: Each aggregator in M broadcasts all trans-
actions which happen in current ∆t and co-signed with a
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DES in its city to the blockchain network. All the consensus
nodes will verify whether their received transactions are valid.
Those valid transactions will be stored in their LTP, and invalid
transactions will be discarded.
3) Pre-prepare: After all non-leader consensus nodes in
M\L(i + 1) have completed above verification process for
received transactions, the leader will package those selected
valid transactions in its LTP into a block BL. Then, the
leader signs this block and broadcasts pre-prepare message
SKL(SKL(BL), pre-prepare) to the blockchain network.
4) Prepare: For each non-leader node k ∈ M\L(i + 1), it
will check the identity of leader and verify the pre-prepare
message from the leader. The block verification needs to
confirm the pointer to the previous block, mercle root is correct
and compare the transactions in BL with the corresponding
transactions in its LTP. If node k believes BL is valid, it
broadcasts this prepare message SKk(SKL(BL), prepare)
to the blockchain network. All consensus nodes must make
decisions in this step, whether to agree or disagree with adding
block BL into the blockchain. Then for each node k ∈ M ,
it gathers all prepare massages from other consensus node,
checks their identities and counts the weighted sum of received
prepare messages. Let Ak(i+1) ⊆M be the set of nodes from
which node k receives prepare messages, including itself. If
satisfying the following inequality∑
a∈Ak(i+1)
Pr[a] ≥
(
2
⌊ |M | − 1
3
⌋
+ 1
)
1
|M | (13)
where Pr[a] = Credita(i)/
∑
j∈M Creditj(i), we say node
k will accept block BL and broadcast commit message
SKk(SKL(BL), commit) to the blockchain network.
5) Commit: After sending their commit messages, they
should waiting commit messages from other consensus node.
For each node k ∈ M , its consensus process is com-
pleted until it recieve sufficient commit messages such that∑
a∈Bk(i+1) Pr[a] ≥ (2b(|M | − 1)/3c + 1)/|M |, where
Bk(i+1) ⊆M is the set of nodes from which node k receives
commit message, including itself.
5) Add a block and update credits: If a consensus node
accepts the new block BL, it will be appended into the
blockchain in a linear and chronological order, which includes
a pointer to the previous block. Any failure occurs in these
three stages will terminate the consensus of current round (do
not add the new block). Besides, before finishing this round,
we need to update the credits of all the consensus nodes
according to the credit model. In next round, the consensus
process will perform based on their new credits.
Failures that terminate the current round and do not add
a new block mainly include the following reasons: (1) the
leader sends invalid block or do not send its packaged block
before the deadline; and (2) too many malicious nodes do
not breadcast prepare messages even though this block is
valid. Shown as node HA1 in Fig. 3, it is a faulty node. The
credit of those nodes that make mistakes in this consensus
process will be reduced. Let f be the number of malicious
nodes. According to [19], supposing f ≤ b(|M | − 1)/3c,
the faults can be tolerated by the consensus system with |M |
nodes. In our BCM, each consensus node’s credit is initialized
as a constant, thereby 2b(|M | − 1)/3c + 1 good nodes can
make sure that (13) is satisfied. As the consensus process
performs more and more times, the good nodes’ credit increase
but malicious nodes’ credit decrease gradually. Therefore, the
credits in system will be more accumulative in good nodes.
According to (13), the number of prepare message and commit
message required to reach a consensus declines, which helps
reduce latency and improve throughput. In summary, secure
and traceable energies trading and digital currency exchange
can be guaranteed by our proposed B-MET system.
V. MULTIPLE ENERGIES TRADING: A STACKELBERG
APPROACH
A non-cooperative Stackelberg game generally refers to
the multilevel decision making processes of a number of
independent decision-makers in response to the decision taken
by the leading player of the game [20]. In this section, we
put forward a multi-leader multi-follower (MLMF) Stackel-
berg game to model the interactions in above smart contract
between aggregators and DESs. Consider a smart city Si, the
MLMF Stackelberg game G can be defined as
G =
{
Si,P,D, {V ie , V ih}, {U ij}Cij∈Si
}
(14)
where the components are shown as follows:
1) Players set Si: The aggregators HAi and EAi act as
leaders, and offer a price respectively to the DESs. Then,
DESij ∈ Si act as followers, and decide on the amount of
electricity and heat they want to sell respectively according to
the offered prices.
2) Strategy spaces P and D: Let P = [ce, re] × [ch, rh]
be the strategy space of two aggregators, where we say
{pie, pih} ∈ P is a feasible strategy of HAi and EAi. Then,
let D = ×Cij∈Si{[0, 1] × [0, 1]} be the strategy space of all
DESs in this city, and we have {αij , βij}Cij∈Si ∈ D is a
feasible strategy of DESs.
3) Utility functions {V ie , V ih} and {U ij}Cij∈Si : Each player
in this game aims to maximize its utility or profit, which re-
flects the quality of strategy that this player chooses. {V ie , V ih}
is the profits of aggregators, defined in (9) and (10); and
{U ij}Cij∈Si are the utilities of DESs in Si, defined in (6).
A. DESs (Followers) Side Analysis
Given a price strategy {pie, pih} ∈ P offered by two ag-
gregators in city Si, each DESij ∈ Si decides the amount
of electricity Eijuse (resp. heat Q
ij
use) that sold to the EAi
(resp. HAi) by adjusting its dispatching factor αij (resp.
βij). Thus, each DESij ∈ Si aims to choose its optimal
dispatching factors {αij , βij} according to {pie, pih} by solving
the following optimization problem (OPDES), that is
max{αij ,βij} U ij(αij , βij) (15)
s.t. Eijuse +Q
ij
use ≥M ijmin; {αij , βij} ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] (16)
where M ijmin is the minimum amount of energy that is required
to maintain the basic life for those residents living in this
community. The objective function, shown in (6), is strictly
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concave and continuously differentiable, this OPDES is a
convex optimization problem, which will be proved later.
Thus, the stationary solution is unique and optimal.
To ensure reasonableness, the Eijmin should be in a valid
range, thus we have M ijmin ∈ (max{Xij , Y ij}, Xij + Y ij).
It means that this minimum requirement is larger than the
production capacity of electricity or heat separately, which
implies that αij and βij are impossible to approach zero
definitely. Hence, the restrictions on (16) can be converted
equivalently to constraint (17), that is
Xij · αij + Y ij · βij ≥M ijmin; αij ≤ 1, βij ≤ 1 (17)
Then, its first-order derivatives is
∂U ij
∂αij
= Xij ·
(
kije b
ij
e
1 + bije Xijαij
− pie
)
(18)
∂U ij
∂βij
= Y ij ·
(
kijh b
ij
h
1 + bijh Y
ijβij
− pih
)
(19)
Let ∂U ij/αij = 0 and ∂U ij/βij = 0, we have
αij◦ =
1
Xij
(
kije
pie
− 1
bije
)
; βij◦ =
1
Y ij
(
kijh
pih
− 1
bijh
)
(20)
Here, we need to note that the setting of parameter kije (resp.
kijh ) must be in a valid range such that α
ij
◦ ∈ (0, 1) (resp.
βij◦ ∈ (0, 1)) for any offered price pie ∈ [ce, re] (resp. pih ∈
[ch, rh]). Or else, this utility function is monotone, and it is
meaningless to adjust its dispatching factors. Base on that,
thereby we can restrict kije and k
ij
h as follows:
kije ∈
(
reX
ij
e− 1 ,
ceX
ij
1− 1/e
)
; kijh ∈
(
rhY
ij
e− 1 ,
chY
ij
1− 1/e
)
(21)
where it assume re < e · ce (resp. rh < e · ch), or else no
such kije (resp. k
ij
h ) can keep α
ij
◦ ∈ (0, 1) (resp. βij◦ ∈ (0, 1))
satisfied for any offered prices.
Sequentially, we use Lagrange’s multipliers λ1, λ2 and
λ3 for constraint (17), thereby the OPDES, shown as
(15) and (17), can be converted to the following form
Lij(αij , βij , λ1, λ2, λ3), that is
Lij = U ij(αij , βij)
+ λ1
(
Xij · αij + Y ij · βij −M ijmin
)
+ λ2(1− αij) + λ3(1− βij) (22)
where we denote Zij = Xij + Y ij − M ijmax. Then, Based
on (22), the complementary slackness conditions (KKT con-
ditions) of OPDES are demonstrated as follows:
∂Lij
∂αij
=
∂U ij
∂αij
+ λ1X
ij − λ2 = 0 (23)
∂Lij
∂βij
=
∂U ij
∂βij
+ λ1Y
ij − λ3 = 0 (24)
λ1
(
Xij · αij + Y ij · βij −M ijmin
)
= 0 (25)
λ2(1− αij) = 0 (26)
λ3(1− βij) = 0 (27)
λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0, λ3 ≥ 0, and constraints (15) (28)
The optimal solutions of OPDES, shown as (15) and (17), can
take one of the following four cases, that is
1) Case 1: For αij < 1 and βij < 1, we have λ2 = λ3 = 0.
Look at (25), if λ1 = 0, substitute it into (23) and (24), we
can get a solution {αij◦ , βij◦ } according to (20). Then, we need
to check whether constraint (17) can be satisfied. If yes, the
optimal solution is {αij◦ , βij◦ }. If no, it means λ1 > 0 and
Xij · αij + Y ij · βij −M ijmin = 0. At this time, by solving
(23) and (24), we have
αij♦ =
1
Xij
(
kije
pie − λ1
− 1
bije
)
(29)
βij♦ =
1
Y ij
(
kijh
pih − λ1
− 1
bijh
)
(30)
Substitute (29) and (30) into (25),
Aijλ1
2 +Bijλ1 + C
ij = 0 (31)
where Aij = M ijmin+1/b
ij
e +1/b
ij
h , B
ij = kije +k
ij
h −Aij(pie+
pih), and C
ij = Aijpiep
i
h−kije pih−kijh pie. By solving (31), we
have two solutions, they are
λ1 =
−Bij ±
√
Bij
2 − 4AijCij
2Aij
(32)
Here, it is easy to verify Bij < 0 and Cij > 0 based on
(9), (21), and M ijmin ∈ (max{Xij , Y ij}, Xij + Y ij), thus it
is possible that ∆ij = Bij2 − 4AijCij < 0. If ∆ij < 0,
there is no real solution; else we need to check whether the
λ1 defined on (32) satisfies λ1 > 0. If λ1 > 0, substitute
(32) into (29) and (30), we obtain a solution {αij♦ , βij♦ }. If it
is feasible, namely αij♦ , β
ij
♦ < 1, the optimal solution can be
determined by {αij♦ , βij♦ }.
2) Case 2: For αij = 1 and βij < 1, we have λ3 = 0. Look
at (25), if λ1 = 0, substitute it into (24), we can get a solution
{1, βij◦ } according to (20). Then, we need to check whether
constraint (17) can be satisfied and λ2 = ∂U ij/∂αij ≥ 0. If
yes, the optimal solution {1, βij◦ }. If no, it means λ1 > 0 and
Y ij · βij +Xij −M ijmin = 0. According to (24), we have βij
which is shown as (30). Substitute (30) into (25),(
kijh
pih − λ1
− 1
bijh
)
+Xij −M ijmin = 0 (33)
By solving (33), we have
λ1 = p
i
h −
kijh b
ij
h
bijh (M
ij
min −Xij) + 1
(34)
If λ1 > 0 and λ2 = ∂U ij/∂αij + λ1Xij ≥ 0, substitute (34)
into (30), we obtain a solution {1, βij}. If we have βij < 1,
the optimal solution can be determined by {1, βij}.
3) Case 3: For αij < 1 and βij = 1, we have λ2 = 0. Look
at (25), if λ1 = 0, substitute it into (23), we can get a solution
{αij◦ , 1} according to (18). Then, we need to check whether
constraint (17) can be satisfied and λ3 = ∂U ij/∂βij ≥ 0. If
yes, the optimal solution is {αij◦ , 1}. If no, it means λ1 > 0
and Xij ·αij +Y ij −M ijmin = 0. According to (23), we have
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αij which is shown as (29). Substitute (29) into (25),(
kije
pie − λ1
− 1
bije
)
+ Y ij −M ijmin = 0 (35)
By solving (35), we have
λ1 = p
i
e −
kije b
ij
e
bije (M
ij
min − Y ij) + 1
(36)
If λ1 > 0 and λ3 = ∂U ij/∂βij + λ1Y ij ≥ 0, substitute (36)
into (29), we obtain a solution {αij, 1}. If we have αij < 1,
the optimal solution can be determined by {αij, 1}.
4) Case 4: For αij = 1 and βij = 1, we have λ1 = 0
because we have assumed M ijmin ≤ Xij + Y ij before.
Substitute it into (23) and (24), we have(
αij♦ = 1
)
=
1
Xij
(
kije X
ij
λ2 + pieX
ij
− 1
bije
)
(37)(
βij♦ = 1
)
=
1
Y ij
(
kijh Y
ij
λ3 + pihY
ij
− 1
bijh
)
(38)
By solving (37) and (38), we have
λ2 =
kije X
ij
Xij + 1/bije
−pieXij ; λ3 =
kijh Y
ij
Y ij + 1/bijh
−pihY ij (39)
According to (9) (21), the maximum value of λ2 can be
obtained when giving kije = ceX
ij/(1 − 1/e). Substitute it
into (39), we have λ2 < ce − pie ≤ 0 because of pie ∈ [ce, re].
By using the same way, we have λ3 < ch−pih ≤ 0 because of
pih ∈ [ch, rh] as well. It does not satisfy (28), thus this solution
{1, 1} is not feasible and cannot occur.
To sum up, offered a price strategy {pie, pih} ∈ P by aggre-
gators, the optimal response of each Cij ∈ Si will be obtained
by above procedure. It is one of the three cases, except case
4, that depends on the offered prices, minimum requirement
M ijmin, and choice of satisfaction cofficient k
ij
e and k
ij
h . Since
the expressions of the solution is very complicated, we cannot
give a unified formal expression to summarize the results that
contains all cases.
B. Aggregators (Leaders) Side Analysis
After receiving the responses Eijexc (resp. Q
ij
exc) of all Cij in
city Si, the profit gained by aggregators EAi (resp. HAi) can
be determined according to (10) and (11). They assume each
DESij ∈ Si will respond to them with the optimal strategy
according to their offered price. Thus, EAi and HAi aim to
choose its optimal prices {pie, pih} by solving the following
optimization problem (OPAGS), that is
max{pie} V
i
e (p
i
e, p
i
h) s.t. p
i
e ∈ [ce, re] (40)
max{pih} V
i
h(p
i
h, p
i
e) s.t. p
i
h ∈ [ch, rh] (41)
where EAi (resp. HAi) attempts to select an optimal price
pi∗e (resp. p
i∗
h ) to maximize its profit given p
i
h (resp. p
i
e).
The objective function, shown in (10) (resp. (11)), is strictly
concave and continuous differentiable with respect to pie (resp.
pih), which will be proved later.
First, we consider electricity aggregator EAi alone. Feed
a price pie into V
i
e (·, pih), the response αij(pie, pih) of each
DESij ∈ Si must be in one of the following four events: (1)
αij = αij◦ ; (2) αij = 1; (3) αij = α
ij
♦ ; and (4) α
ij = αij .
Then, its first order derivatives is
∂αij/∂pie = −kije /
(
Xij(pie)
2
)
(42)
= 0 (43)
= −kije /
(
Xij(pie − λ1)2
)
, λ1 = (31) (44)
= −kije /
(
Xij(pie − λ1)2
)
, λ1 = (34) (45)
where it is one-to one correspondences between (42)−(45)
and event (1)−(4). Then, the first-order derivative of EAi’s
objective function is
∂V ie
∂pie
= −
∑
Cij∈Si
Xij
(
(1− αij) + (re − pie)
∂αij
∂pie
)
(46)
Combined with (42)−(45), let ∂V ie /∂pie = 0, we can get a
solution pˆie that maximizes V
i
e (·, pih) given pih. However, this
pˆie is constrained on the range of [ce, re], thus the optimal price
strategy p¯ie of EAi is shown as follows:
p¯ie =

re, if pˆie ≥ re
ce, if pˆie ≤ ce
pˆie, if ce < pˆ
i
e < re
(47)
Due to the fact that the profit function V ie (·, pih) given pih is
strictly concave with respect to pie, it increases first and then
decreases with the increase of pie. Thus, the maximum profit
is obtained at the price of re when pˆie ≥ re; Similarly, the
maximum profit is obtained at the price of ce when pˆie ≤ ce;
else obtained at stationary point.
Then, we consider heat aggregator HAi alone. Feed a price
pih into V
i
h(·, pie), the respone βij(pie, pih) of each DESij ∈ Si
must be in one of the following four events: (1) βij = βij◦ ; (2)
βij = 1; (3) βij = βij♦ ; and (4) β
ij = βij . Then, its first order
derivative ∂βij/∂pih can be computed by replacing X
ij with
Y ij , kije with k
ij
h , and p
i
e with p
i
h in (42)-(45), corresponding
to event (1)−(4). Then, the first-order derivative of HAi’s
objective function is
∂V ih
∂pih
= −
∑
Cij∈Si
Y ij
(
(1− βij) + (rh − pih)
∂βij
∂pih
)
(48)
Let ∂V ih/∂p
i
h = 0, we can get a solution pˆ
i
h that maximizes
V ih(·, pie) given pie. Similar to (47), constrained on the range
of [ch, rh], the optimal price p¯ih of HAi can be formulated
similar to the analysis of (47) from its concavity.
C. Stackalberg Equilibrium
The aggregators, EAi and HAi in a smart city Si, play
a non-cooperative game with each other to offer the unit
prices for electricity and heat. They all want to maximize
their profit according to their profit function defined on (10)
and (11). We denote this game between aggregators by A =
{{HAi,EAi},P, {V ie , V ih}} and introduce the concept of the
Nash equilibrium (NE) shown as follows:
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium). Given a game A defined
as above, a feasible price strategy {p˜ie, p˜ih} ∈ P is the Nash
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equilibrium if no player can improve its profit by changing its
strategy unilaterally, that is
V ie (p˜
i
e, p˜
i
h) ≥ V ie (pie, p˜ih); V ih(p˜ih, p˜ie) ≥ V ih(pih, p˜ie) (49)
There is a property that at the NE, no aggregator attempts to
offer a new price again because they all achieve their mutually
satisfactions respectively. Then, we need to study the existence
and uniqueness of the NE of game A between two aggregators
in a city.
Lemma 1. The Nash equilibirum of game A between aggre-
gators always exist and is unique.
Proof. The strategy space in game A has been denoted by P =
[ce, re] × [ch, rh], which is a convex, closed, and non-empty
subset of the space R2. Take aggregate EAi as an example,
αij is the responsive dispatching factor given the offered price
{pie, pih} ∈ P from community Cij ∈ Si. From (42)−(45), its
second-order derivatives is
∂2αij/∂pie
2
= 2kije /
(
Xij(pie)
3
)
(50)
= 0 (51)
= 2kije /
(
Xij(pie − λ1)3
)
, λ1 = (29) (52)
= 2kije /
(
Xij(pie − λ1)3
)
, λ1 = (32) (53)
where they correspond to event (1)−(4). Then, the second-
order derivative of EAi’s objective function is
∂2V ie
∂pie
2 =
∑
Cij∈Si
Xij
(
2 · ∂α
ij
∂pie
− (re − pie)
∂2αij
∂pie
2
)
(54)
Here, observe that ∂αij/∂pie ≤ 0 from (42)−(45), and
∂2V ie /∂p
i
e
2 ≥ 0 from (50)−(53), we have ∂2V ie /∂pie2 ≤ 0.
Thus, V ie (·, pih) is concave with respect to pie.
Consider aggregator HAi and βij from community Cij ∈
Si, its second-order derivative ∂2βij/∂pie
2 can be computed
by replacing Xij with Y ij , kije with k
ij
h , and p
i
e with p
i
h
in (48)−(51). Then, the second-order derivative of HAi’s
objective function is
∂2V ih
∂pih
2 =
∑
Cij∈Si
Y ij
(
2 · ∂β
ij
∂pih
− (rh − pih)
∂2βij
∂pih
2
)
(55)
By similar analysis, we have ∂2V ih/∂p
i
h
2 ≤ 0 and V ih(·, pie)
is concave with respect to pih. Thus, game A is a concave 2-
person game. Because of their concavity, the Nash equilibrium
exists and is unique according to [21].
In a smart city Si, the aggregators offer the price strategy
{pie, pih} ∈ P in the first stage, then each DESij ∈ Si decides
its optimal dispatching strategy {αij , βij} according to the
offered prices in the second stage. It formulates a MLMF
Stackelberg game G between aggregators and DESs, shown as
(14). The optimal strategy set {{p˜ie, p˜ih}, {γil}Cil∈Si}, where
{γil} is the optimal response of community Cil ∈ Si based on
its previous leaders’ prices, can be obtained at the Stackelberg
equilibrium (SE), defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Stackelberg Equilibrium). Given a game G
defined as (14), a feasible strategy {{p˜ie, p˜ih}, {γil}Cil∈Si} is
Algorithm 1 Find NE
Input: Game G in a city Si and a small step ∆
Output: Price strategy {p˜ie, p˜ih}
1: Initialize: {p˜ie, p˜ih} ← {ce, ch}
2: while True do
3: {x, y} ← {p˜ie, p˜ih}
4: // Consider aggregator EAi
5: if V ie (p˜ie + ∆, p˜ih) ≥ V ie (p˜ie, p˜ih) and V ie (p˜ie + ∆, p˜ih) ≥
V ie (p˜
i
e −∆, p˜ih) then
6: p˜ie ← min{re, p˜ie + ∆}
7: else if V ie (p˜ie − ∆, p˜ih) ≥ V ie (p˜ie, p˜ih) and V ie (p˜ie −
∆, p˜ih) ≥ V ie (p˜ie + ∆, p˜ih) then
8: p˜ie ← max{ce, p˜ie −∆}
9: end if
10: // Consider aggregator HAi
11: if V ih(p˜ih + ∆, p˜ie) ≥ V ih(p˜ih, p˜ie) and V ih(p˜ih + ∆, p˜ie) ≥
V ih(p˜
i
h −∆, p˜ie) then
12: p˜ih ← min{rh, p˜ih + ∆}
13: else if V ih(p˜ih − ∆, p˜ie) ≥ V ih(p˜ih, p˜ie) and V ih(p˜ih −
∆, p˜ie) ≥ V ih(p˜ih + ∆, p˜ie) then
14: p˜ih ← max{ch, p˜ih −∆}
15: end if
16: if {x, y} = {p˜ie, p˜ih} then
17: Break
18: end if
19: // Reduce ∆ once for each iteration
20: ∆← δ ·∆
21: end while
22: return {p˜ie, p˜ih}
the Stackelberg equilibrium if no player, including leaders
and followers, can improve its utility or profit by changing
its strategy unilaterally, that is
U ij
(
p˜i, {γil}Cil∈Si
) ≥ U ij (p˜i, γ¯ij ∪ {γil}Cil∈Si\Cij) (56)
V ie
(
p˜i, {γil}Cil∈Si
) ≥ V ie ({pie, p˜ih}, {γil}Cil∈Si) (57)
V ih
(
p˜i, {γil}Cil∈Si
) ≥ V ih ({p˜ie, pih}, {γil}Cil∈Si) (58)
where we denote prices p˜i = {p˜ie, p˜ih} and γ¯ij is any feasible
strategy of DESij .
After reaching the SE, none of them tends to change its
strategy again because they cannot improve their utilities or
profits further by changing unilaterally. Then, we need to study
the existence and uniqueness of the SE of game G between
aggregators and DESs in a city.
Theorem 1. The Stackelberg equilibirum of game G between
aggregators and DESs always exist and is unique.
Proof. In this game G, the aggregators will offer prices to
those DESs to purchase energies in their city first. From
Lemma 1, a Nash equilibrium always exists and is unique
between aggregators. According to the aforementioned anal-
ysis on DESs side, they are able to respond to aggregators
with their optimal dispatching strategies based on the offered
prices and their restrictions. Thus, the Stackelberg equilibrium
always exists and is unique.
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D. Distributed Algorithm
In order to find the NE between aggregators based on
the optimal responses from DESs, we adopt the sub-gradient
technique [22] [23] [24] for determining price strategies. It is
shown in Algorithm 1. In Algorithm 1, each aggregators is
assigned with its lowest price. At this time, the dispatching
factors of each DES in this city is closest to one, which
should be in feasible space defined on (17). Then, consider
aggregator EAi, in each iteration, it updates its price in manner
of increasing by ∆ or decreasing by ∆, where ∆ is a given
small step. According to current prices {p˜ie, p˜ih}, we compare
the profits of EAi by offering a price p˜ie, p˜
i
e+ ∆, and p˜
i
e−∆,
then choose the best one and update the price p˜ie. Consider
aggregator HAi similarly, we compare the profits of HAi by
offering a price p˜ih, p˜
i
h + ∆, and p˜
i
h−∆, then choose the best
one and update the price p˜ih. At last, we update ∆ with δ ·∆
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is a attenuation factor.
Theorem 2. Given an initial price strategy and step ∆, the
Nash equilibrium of game A can be obtained by the sub-
gradient algorithm, shown in Algorithm 1.
Proof. Based on the conclusion of [22] [23], the sub-gradient
algorithm can converge to an optimal solution in convex opti-
mization. The objective functions of aggregators are concave,
thus they cannot improve its profit by changing strategies
unilaterally when reaching the optimal solution.
VI. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we conduct several experiments to model
price competition and energies trading in a smart city.
A. Simulation Setup
Consider a city S = {{EA,HA}, {C1,C2, · · · ,Cn}}, we
denote the number of communities in this city by n. At
the standard atmosphere, the calorific value of natural gas is
q = 3.6× 107 J/m3 on average. The retail price of electricity
in U.S. is 0.2 dollar/kw · h. According to the conversion
relationship of 1 kw · h = 3.6 × 106 J, it is 5.5 × 10−8
dollar/J. Equivalently, we regard it as re = 5.5 × 10−8
coin/J in our B-METS. The electric conversion of GT is
ηg = 0.5. We define the maximum gas consumption Fm = 200
m3/day and its unit price cf = 1.08 coin/m3. Thus, we have
ce = 3.00×10−8 coin/J and pe ∈ [3.00×10−8, 5.50×10−8]
for the EA definitely. The efficiency of heat recovery system
is given by ηr = 0.8, thereby we have ch = 3.75 × 10−8
coin/J. The retail price of heat is rh = 6.25× 10−8 coin/J.
Thus, we have ph ∈ [3.75 × 10−8, 6.25 × 10−8] for the HA
definitely. According to (9), we have be = 4.773 × 10−10
and bh = 5.966 × 10−10. Then according to (21), we have
ke ∈ [115.24, 170.85] and kh ∈ [104.76, 170.85].
B. Simulation Results
1) Concavity of functions: Consider a city S that has only
one community, we define this DES’s satisfaction coefficient
under two settings k1 = (ke, kh) = (143.05, 137.81) and
k2 = (ke, kh) = (159.73, 117.98). Fig. 4 draws the objective
(a) EA’s profit Ve under k1 (b) HA’s profit Vh under k1
(c) DES’s utility U under k1 (d) EA’s profit Ve under k2
(e) HA’s profit Vh under k2 (f) DES’s utility U under k2
Fig. 4. The objective function of entities, including EA, HA, and DES, in
city S under the setting k1 and k2.
function of entities in city S under the two settings, where
we define the minimum energy restriction at OPDES as
Mmin = 0. It means that there is no restriction on DES
to choose their partition coefficients in order to demonstrate
complete functional properties. Let us look at (a) (b) (c) in
Fig. 4. Shown as (a), as pe increases, EA’s profit function
increases first and then decreases under any price ph offered
by HA, and its objective value has nothing to do with ph.
There is no competitiveness between EA and HA because of
no restriction. It proves the profit function Ve(·, ph) is concave
with respect to pe. Similarly, shown as (b), we have HA’s profit
function Vh(·, pe) is concave with respect to ph as well. From
(c), it is the utility function of this DES according to offered
prices pe = ph = 4.5 × 10−8, which prove the concavity
of DES’s utility function. It shows that our previous analysis
about DESs’ response is valid, and DESs are always able to
respond aggregators with the optimal strategy according to
the prices offered by aggregators. If a Nash equilibrium exists
between aggregators, then a Stackelberg equilibrium among
players in game G must exist definitely.
2) Effect of satisfaction coefficients: Shown as (d) (e) (f)
in Fig. 4, under the setting k2, shown as (d) (e) (f) in Fig. 4,
we increase ke but decrease kb. Shown as (d), as ke increases,
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(a) EA’s profit function Ve(·, ph) (b) DES’s optimal response α
(c) DES’s optimal response β (d) HA’s profit function Vh(·, pe)
(e) DES’s optimal response α (f) DES’s optimal response β
Fig. 5. The objective functions of aggregators and DES’s optimal responses
in city S under the setting M1.
the maximum point that obtains the maximum profit for EA
moves toward the positive direction. It implies that the EA
has to offer a higher price to buy electricity from DES in
order to gain the maximum profit, because electricity used
to serve community can contribute more utility than before.
Similarly, shown as (e), as kh decreases, the maximum point
that obtains the maximum profit for HA moves toward the
negative direction. From (f), as ke increases and kh decreases,
the maximum point that obtains the maximum utility for DES
according to pe = ph = 4.5 × 10−8 moves from (α◦, β◦) =
(0.301, 0.481) in (c) to (0.404, 0.328) in (f). Thus, we have
α◦ (resp. α◦) increases with the growth of ke (resp. kh).
3) Effect of restrictions: From the definition of OPDES, we
have a restriction that requires a feasible solution must satisfy
X ·α+Y ·β ≥Mmin and Mmin ∈ (max{X,Y }, X+Y ). Here,
we all adopt satisfaction coefficient k1. In this part, we con-
sider two different settings, that is M1 = 0.7×max{X,Y }+
0.3× (X +Y ) and M2 = 0.5×max{X,Y }+ 0.5× (X +Y )
where M1 < M2. In order to demonstrate the effect of restric-
tions clearly, we use 2D figures instead of 3D figures. Fig. 5
and Fig. 6 draw the objective functions of aggregators and
optimal responses of DES according to aggregators’ offered
prices in city S under the two settings. Let us discuss the
(a) EA’s profit function Ve(·, ph) (b) DES’s optimal response α
(c) DES’s optimal response β (d) HA’s profit function Vh(·, pe)
(e) DES’s optimal response α (f) DES’s optimal response β
Fig. 6. The objective functions of aggregators and DES’s optimal responses
in city S under the setting M2.
typical black curve, shown as (a) with ph = 3.75×10−8 in Fig.
5. At the beginning, EA’s profit increases from pe = 3×10−8
to 3.13×10−8 where DES’s α decreases but β keeps constant.
This response implies that DES’s optimal strategy can be
obtained at (α◦, β◦) where the first-order derivative is equal to
zero. Then, the middle section is a smooth curve, where DES’s
response is at the tight border X · α + Y · β = M1. In this
section, we can see DES’s response α decreases linearly and
β increases linearly. Finally starting from pe = 4.5 × 10−8,
EA’s profit decreases linearly because of β = 1. Let us look
at the yellow curve, shown as (a) with ph = 6.25 × 10−8 in
Fig. 5. At the beginning, EA’s profit is equal to zero since
DES responds with (α = 1, β = 0.3). Due to the high price
offered by EA and low price offered by EA, all electricity
should be partitioned to meet the minimum energy restriction
and only sell heat for making revenue. For Fig. 6, compared
with Fig. 6, we find that these functions show some structural
changes as Mmin increases. The restriction M2 in Fig. 6 is
larger than M1 in Fig. 5, which indicates the DES has to
use more energy to serve its community. Shown as (a) (d) in
Fig. 6, we can know that the DES’s optimal strategy cannot be
obtained at stationary points (α◦, β◦). All DES’s responses are
at the tight border X ·α+Y ·β = M2. Besides, the sections of
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(a) Initialization: (re, rh) (b) Initialization: (re, rh)
(c) Initialization: (ce, ch) (d) Initialization: (ce, ch)
(e) Initialization: ( ce+re
2
, ch+rh
2
) (f) Initialization: ( ce+re
2
, ch+rh
2
)
Fig. 7. The process of converging to Stackelberg equilibrium with different
initializations under the restriction M1.
α = 1 or β = 1 are much larger than that under the restriction
M1. However, no matter what Mmin is, the EA (HA) always
needs to offer an increasing price in order to get its maximum
profit as the price offered by HA (EA) increases. This reflects
the competition between aggregators, which is different from
that there is no restriction in Fig. 4. Therefore, the restriction
settings in OPDES have significant effects on the objective
functions of aggregators and optimal responses of DES.
4) Stackelberg Equilibrium: Consider a city S that has
five communities, we define these DESj’s satisfaction co-
efficients as kj = (kje, k
j
h) where j ∈ {1, · · · , 5}. We
assume k1 = (115.24, 137.81), k2 = (129.14, 137.81),
k3 = (143.04, 137.81), k4 = (156.94, 137.81), and k5 =
(170.85, 137.81) in this part. Fig. 7 draws the process of
converging to Stackelberg equilibrium with different initializa-
tions under the restriction M1. Here, the parameters defined
in Algorithm 1 is given by ∆ = 1 × 10−10 and δ = 0.999.
The initialization (re, rh) implies to give {p˜ie, p˜ih} ← {re, rh}
in line 3 of Algorithm 1. Take (a) (b) in Fig. 7 as an example,
at the beginning, the aggregators offer the highest prices, thus
they hardly gain any profit. By interacting with the five DES,
the aggregators decrease their offering prices gradually in each
iteration in order to improve profits. At approximately 100-th
(a) ∆ = 1 × 10−9 (b) ∆ = 1 × 10−9
(c) ∆ = 1 × 10−10 (d) ∆ = 1 × 10−10
Fig. 8. The process of converging to Stackelberg equilibrium with different
∆ under the restriction M2.
iteration, they cannot improve their revenues by changing their
strategies unilaterally, thus reaching the Nash Equilibrium.
The DESs in S always respond aggregators with their optimal
strategies, thus the Stackelberg equilibrium can be reached.
From (a) (c) (e) in Fig. 7, we can see that they can reach
the same equilibrium point regardless of what initialization
is. However, the initialization affects the rate of convergence,
and a good initialization can converge to the equilibrium
point quickly. Fig. 8 draws the process of converging to
Stackelberg equilibrium with different ∆ under the restriction
M2. Here, we adopt the initialization (ce, ch) and δ = 0.999
as well. From (a) (c) in Fig. 8, they can quickly approach to
equilibrium point when we adopt the larger ∆. Nevertheless,
it has to wait for ∆ to drop to a relatively low level in order
to improve this solution further. Therefore, how to choose the
value of ∆ depends on your demand. If we do not require
high accuracy but high speed, it is recommended to choose a
large ∆; otherwise we should choose a small one.
5) Centralized vs. Distributed: For the aggregators, it is
hard to know the complete information about all DESs in its
city. Even if knowing partial coefficients, such as coefficient
satisfactions, the settings of minimum energy restriction are
very flexible, which will change with the fluctuations of
the community population, season, and other factors. The
optimal responses from DES are unpredictable. Thereby the
aggregators can only obtain feedback information of DESs
in a distributed manner, that is to update their offering price
iteratively by interacting with DESs in their city.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied multiple energies trading problem
systematically. First, we proposed an architecture of B-MET
system to address the security and privacy protection issues
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in distributed energy trading. In order to reduce latency and
improve throughput, we introduce a credit model and design a
new byzantine-based consensus mechanism based on it. Then,
we model the interactions between aggregators and DESs in
a smart city by MLMF Stackelberg game, which is more
complex and realistic than the modes that have appeared
before. We solve it step by step, show the existence and
uniqueness of SE, and design a sub-gradient algorithm to
find NE between aggregators. Finally, the results of numerical
simulations indicated that our model is valid, and verify the
correctness and efficiency of our algorithm.
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